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Abstract: This paper investigates conditions under which the adverse selection principal-
agent problem can be decomposed into a collection of pointwise maximization problems.
The analysis uses an extension of the type assignment approach to optimal nonuniform
pricing, pioneered by Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984), to derive simple suﬃcient con-
ditions under which such a decomposition is possible. These conditions do not preclude
optimal bunching that arises because virtual surplus functions violate the single-crossing
property or participation constraints bind at interior types.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers adverse selection principal-agent models with quasilin-
ear utility functions and a one-dimensional decision variable (in addition to
monetary transfers). The type of the agent is one dimensional and continu-
ously distributed; the agent’s preferences satisfy a single-crossing property.
The standard analysis of such models relies on the assumption that the
agent’s rent function is monotonic to transform the principal’s maximization
into a reduced problem, maximizing expected virtual surplus (i.e., surplus
adjusted to account for the agent’s informational rent (Myerson [21])) sub-
ject only to a monotonicity constraint. If, in addition, the virtual surplus
function satisﬁes a single-crossing condition, then the monotonicity con-
straint does not bind and the problem can be decomposed into a collection
of unconstrained pointwise maximization problems. The characterization of
optimal contracts in such decomposable principal-agent problems is partic-
ularly simple and leads to rich economic insights. As emphasized by Rochet
and Stole [26] in the context of multidimensional screening models, much of
the diﬃculty in extending the analysis of principal-agent models beyond the
standard setting is caused by the loss of the simple, recursive structure that
allows for a decomposition of the problem.
Even within the one-dimensional framework we consider, there are many
situations in which the standard method does not lead to a decomposable
problem. First, single crossing of the virtual surplus may fail and hence the
monotonicity constraint in the reduced problem may bind. To character-
ize the resulting optimal bunches, the standard approach resorts to ironing
techniques (cf. Baron and Myerson [2], Guesnerie and Laﬀont [11], and
Mussa and Rosen [23]). Second, and more fundamentally, the rent func-
tion may be non-monotonic. The participation constraint in the standard
approach then becomes non-trivial, in the sense that the set of agents for
which the constraint binds can no longer be identiﬁed a priori. As empha-
sized by Jullien [13], this implies that—in contrast to the case in which the
rent function is monotonic—the virtual surplus function to be maximized is
itself endogenously determined, undermining the simplicity of the reduced
problem obtained in the ﬁrst step of the standard method. Extensions of
the standard method dealing with this diﬃculty have been developed by,
1for instance, Lewis and Sappington [15], [16], Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
[17], and Biais, Martimort and Rochet [3]. Jullien [13] oﬀers a full-ﬂedged
characterization of optimal contracts. These papers rely on techniques from
optimal control theory to characterize the optimal bunching that arises from
the interaction between the participation constraint and the principal’s ob-
jective of minimizing informational rents. In the process, the decomposabil-
ity of the problem and the corresponding interpretation of the optimality
conditions is lost.
This paper identiﬁes circumstances under which principal-agent prob-
lems can be decomposed into a collection of unconstrained, pointwise max-
imization problems, even though optimal bunching may arise as a result of
the virtual surplus function violating the single-crossing property or the par-
ticipation constraint binding at interior (endogenously determined) types.
The key observation underlying our analysis is that the conditions required
for decomposability depend upon how one formulates the principal’s prob-
lem.
The standard approach invokes the revelation principle to write the prob-
lem as a choice over functions attaching outcomes and rents to types of
the agent. We obtain an equivalent formulation of the principal’s problem
as one of assigning types of the agents and tariﬀs to decisions, subject to
constraints analogous to those of the standard formulation. This formu-
lation of the principal’s problem as an assignment problem is inspired by
the analysis of optimal nonuniform pricing in Goldman, Leland and Sib-
ley [9]. They consider a model in which the agent’s utility is increasing
in type and propose a formulation of the principal’s problem which, given
this monotonicity, is eﬀectively equivalent to the assignment problem. Our
work provides foundations for the analysis in Goldman, Leland and Sibley
by formally demonstrating the equivalence of the assignment problem to
the standard formulation of the principal’s problem. At the same time, we
extend their formulation to models in which the agent’s utility function may
be non-monotonic in type.
We then investigate the conditions under which the assignment problem
can be reduced to a maximization subject only to the constraint that the
assignment of types to decisions be increasing. In contrast to the standard
approach, the issue here is whether one can identify the optimal tariﬀ as-
signed to some decision (rather than the optimal rent of some type of the
agent, namely one for whom the participation constraint binds). We intro-
duce a condition on the agent’s utility function, called the minmax property,
generalizing the requirement that the agent’s utility be monotonic in type,
under which such an identiﬁcation is possible. The class of models satis-
2fying the minmax property is signiﬁcantly broader than that in which the
agent’s utility is monotonic, including models of market making (cf. Biais,
Martimort and Rochet [3] and Glosten [7, 8]) and countervailing incentives
(cf. Lewis and Sappington [15, 16], Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [17], and
Feenstra and Lewis [5]).
The principal’s objective in our reduced maximization problem can be
interpreted as an integral over a marginal proﬁt function. If, in addition to
the minmax property, this marginal proﬁt function satisﬁes a single-crossing
property, then the assignment problem can be decomposed. The single-
crossing condition on marginal proﬁts does not imply the single-crossing
condition on the virtual surplus function required for decomposition in the
standard approach. Instead, it is equivalent to the assumption that virtual
surpluses are strictly concave.
As noted above, our work is related to the analysis of optimal nonlin-
ear prices in Goldman, Leland and Sibley [9]. It is also related to Wilson’s
demand proﬁle approach [27]. Both approaches formulate the principal’s
problem as one of choosing an optimal marginal tariﬀ schedule and both
lead to the observation that the solution may be obtained by pointwise
maximization, even when such a decomposition is not feasible in the stan-
dard approach. (See Rochet and Stole [26] for a discussion of this point in
the context of the demand proﬁle approach.) Neither Goldman, Leland and
Sibley [9] nor Wilson [27] show the equivalence of their approaches to the
standard approach at the level of generality that we prove equivalence to
the assignment approach. In particular, there is no counterpart to our result
establishing the decomposability of models satisfying the minmax property.
The following section introduces the model. Section 3 reviews the decom-
position of the principal-agent problem under the standard approach. Sec-
tion 4 presents the assignment approach. Section 5 introduces the minmax
property and shows how it can be used to reduce the assignment approach.
Section 6 establishes the decomposition results and uses them to present an
alternative characterization of optimal bunching. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The principal and the agent contract on a one-dimensional decision x ∈
[x,x], referred to as a quantity, and a monetary transfer m ∈ I R. The
agent’s utility from trade depends on his type θ ∈ [θ,θ] and is given by
u(x,θ)−m. The principal’s utility from trade may also depend on the type
of the agent (i.e., we allow for common values) and is given by v(x,θ) + m.
3The agent knows his type. From the principal’s perspective the agent’s type
is drawn from the interval [θ,θ] according to the distribution function F(θ),
with diﬀerentiable density f(θ) > 0.
The functions u(·) and v(·) are assumed to be thrice continuously diﬀer-
entiable on [x,x]×[θ,θ]. In addition, we assume throughout that the agent’s
utility function satisﬁes the strict single-crossing property (denoting partial
derivatives by subscripts):
uxθ(x,θ) > 0, ∀x,θ. (1)
The principal designs a contract to maximize his expected utility from
trade, subject to an incentive compatibility constraint and a participation
constraint that each type of agent receives at least his reservation utility,
which we normalize to zero.1 From the revelation principal there is no
loss of generality in restricting the principal to truthful direct revelation







subject to the incentive constraint
u(x(θ),θ) − m(θ) ≥ u(x(ψ),θ) − m(ψ), ∀θ,ψ
and the participation constraint
u(x(θ),θ) − m(θ) ≥ 0 ∀θ.
Using the rent function r : [θ,θ] → I R deﬁned by r(θ) = u(x(θ),θ)−m(θ)
to eliminate the transfers m(·) simpliﬁes the maximization program. First,
rewrite the incentive constraint as
r(θ) − r(ψ) ≥ u(x(ψ),θ) − u(x(ψ),ψ), ∀θ,ψ. (2)
We refer to a pair (x(·),r(·)) as an allocation. An allocation is incentive
compatible if it satisﬁes (2). The following characterization of incentive
1It is without loss of generality to assume that the reservation utility of all types of the
agent is given by zero, as we can always interpret utilities as surpluses over a (possibly type
dependent) reservation utility. Imposing full participation as a constraint is innocuous if,
as in many applications, there is a “no-trade” quantity x that is equivalent to exclusion,
i.e., such that u(x,θ) = v(x,θ) = 0 for all θ. See Jullien [13] for further discussion of the
principal-agent problem with exclusion and conditions under which it is without loss of
generality to impose full participation.
4compatible allocations is familiar for the case in which additional smoothness
conditions are imposed on the set of feasible allocations (e.g., Fudenberg and
Tirole [6, ch. 7]). For the general case we consider here the result follows
from Rochet [25] and Milgrom and Segal [20].
Lemma 1 An allocation (x(·),r(·)) is incentive compatible if and only if
x(·) is increasing (i.e., x(θ) ≥ x(ψ) for all θ > ψ) and r(θ) = r(θ) + R θ
θ uθ(x(˜ θ), ˜ θ)d˜ θ for all θ.
Replacing the incentive constraint (2) with this characterization while using





[v(x(θ),θ) + u(x(θ),θ) − r(θ)]f(θ)dθ,





x(·) is increasing, (4)
r(θ) = r(θ) +
Z θ
θ
uθ(x(˜ θ), ˜ θ)d˜ θ, ∀θ, (5)
r(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ. (6)
We refer to the program (3)–(6) as the allocation problem. An allocation
is feasible if it satisﬁes (4)–(6) and optimal if it solves the allocation problem.
We say that a quantity allocation or rent allocation is optimal if it is part
of an optimal allocation. Jullien [13] shows that under the assumptions
maintained here an optimal allocation exists.
Throughout the paper we will use the following example to illustrate the
main points of our analysis.
Example. Let the agent’s and principal’s utility functions be given by








where α,β,γ ≥ 0, β + γ > 0, and x ≤ 0 ≤ x.
53 Decomposing the Allocation Problem
This section reviews the standard approach to the allocation problem, for
the case in which the agent’s utility function is monotonic in type. It is
straightforward to compute the payoﬀ-maximizing rent allocation as a func-
tion of the quantity allocation to be implemented. This leads to a reduced
problem, determining an optimal quantity allocation, to which standard so-
lution techniques can be applied if the agent’s utility function is monotonic.
If in addition the relevant virtual surplus function (cf. Myerson [21]) satis-
ﬁes a single-crossing property, then the reduced problem can be decomposed
into a collection of pointwise maximization problems.
3.1 Reduction
Suppose the agent’s utility is increasing in type, i.e. uθ(x,θ) ≥ 0 for all x,θ.
It then follows from (5) that an incentive compatible allocation satisﬁes the
participation constraint (6) if and only if r(θ) ≥ 0. Thus, for any given
increasing quantity allocation x(·), the principal’s payoﬀ is maximized by
setting r(θ) = 0 and r(θ) =
R θ
θ uθ(x(˜ θ), ˜ θ)d˜ θ. Substituting this expression
for the rent function into the principal’s objective function and integrating












is the virtual surplus function, which takes into account the rents that must
be left to types higher than θ if quantity x(θ) is assigned to type θ.
The single-crossing property (1) ensures that the agent’s utility will be
increasing in type whenever uθ(x,θ) ≥ 0 holds. In particular, the agent’s
utility is increasing in type in models of monopoly pricing (Goldman, Leland
and Sibley [9], Maskin and Laﬀont [18], and Mussa and Rosen [23]), in
which x = 0 corresponds to the no-trade outcome (with u(0,θ) = 0) and
c(x,θ) = −v(x,θ) corresponds to the principal’s cost function (usually taken
to be type independent).
An equivalent argument applies to the case in which the agent’s util-
ity function is decreasing in type, i.e. uθ(x,θ) ≤ θ for all x,θ. Condition
6(5) then implies that an incentive compatible allocation satisﬁes the par-
ticipation constraint (6) if and only if r(θ) ≥ 0. Substituting the resulting
expression for the payoﬀ maximizing rent function r(θ) =
R θ
θ uθ(x(˜ θ), ˜ θ)d˜ θ
into the principal’s objective function leads to the conclusion that a quantity











is the virtual surplus function, which takes into account the rents that must
be left to types below θ.
For an example in which the agent’s utility function is decreasing in type,
think of the agent as a regulated ﬁrm, as in Baron and Myerson [2] (see also
Laﬀont and Tirole [14]). Let x = 0 correspond to an outcome in which there
is no trade, satisfying u(x,θ) = 0, and let q = −x ≥ 0 correspond to the
quantity produced by the regulated ﬁrm, at cost c(q,θ) = −u(x,θ). The
single-crossing property (1) then corresponds to the standard assumption
that the ﬁrm’s marginal production costs cq(q,θ) are increasing in type.
Because u(x,θ) = 0, the single-crossing property implies uθ(x,θ) < 0 for
x < x.
3.2 Relaxation
The usual procedure for solving (9) and (10) is to relax the monotonicity
constraint and maximize the objective functions pointwise, thus decompos-
ing the problem into a sequence of independent maximization problems.
This pointwise maximization yields a quantity allocation that is optimal if
it is increasing. If the virtual surplus σ(·) satisﬁes the single-crossing condi-
tion σxθ(·) ≥ 0, the pointwise maximization maxx σ(x,θ) will indeed give a
quantity allocation that is increasing in θ and will thus solve (9).2 Similarly,
if the virtual surplus β(·) satisﬁes the single-crossing condition βxθ(·) ≥ 0,
then (10) can be solved by pointwise maximization.
Matters are more complicated if the pointwise maximization does not
give an increasing solution. To ensure the monotonicity constraint is sat-
isﬁed, the analysis must then resort to ironing techniques, as developed by
Guesnerie and Laﬀont [11], Mussa and Rosen [23], and Myerson [21]).
2It follows from Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon [19] that there exists an increasing
selection from argmaxx σ(x,θ) if the single-crossing condition σxθ(·) ≥ 0 holds.
7The decomposition of the allocation problem thus rests on the twin as-
sumptions that the agent’s utility is monotonic in type and the virtual sur-
pluses satisfy the single-crossing property. The assignment approach allows
us to weaken the ﬁrst assumption while replacing the second with the as-
sumption that the virtual surpluses are strictly concave.
Example. In the example given by (7)–(8), the agent’s utility function
is increasing in type if and only if x = 0, in which case an optimal quan-
tity allocation is given by a solution to (9). The single-crossing condition









which suﬃces to solve (9) by pointwise maximization. Note that whenever
the pointwise solution is determined by the ﬁrst order condition σx(x,θ) = 0
for all θ, then (11) is also necessary for decomposing the allocation problem.
Similarly, the agent’s utility will be decreasing in type if and only if
x = 0, in which case an optimal quantity allocation is given by a solution to










and suﬃces to decompose the allocation problem. Condition (12) is also
necessary if the solution to the pointwise maximization is interior for all θ.
4 The Assignment Problem
We replace the maximization with respect to allocations with an equiva-
lent maximization with respect to assignments (θ(·),t(·)). An assignment
consists of a type assignment θ : [x,x] → [θ,θ] and a tariﬀ assignment
t : [x,x] → I R. We can view a type assignment as specifying the type of
agent θ(x) who chooses quantity x, and a tariﬀ assignment as a nonlinear
pricing schedule specifying the accompanying transfer t(x). Subsection 4.1
motivates the assignment approach and formulates the assignment problem,
while Subsection 4.2 proves it is equivalent to the allocation problem.
4.1 Motivation
The taxation principle (see Guesnerie [10, chapter 1], Hammond [12], and
Rochet [24]) asserts that an allocation (x(·),r(·)) is incentive compatible
8if and only if there exists a tariﬀ assignment t : [x,x] → I R implementing
the allocation, in the sense that x(θ) ∈ argmaxx[u(x,θ) − t(x)] and r(θ) =
maxx[u(x,θ) − t(x)] for all θ. In addition, it is clear that an allocation
determined by these conditions will satisfy the participation constraint (6)
if and only if the tariﬀ assignment satisﬁes the constraint maxx[u(x,θ) −
t(x)] ≥ 0. This suggests that instead of viewing the principal as choosing a
feasible allocation we may view the principal as choosing a tariﬀ assignment
subject to the constraint maxx[u(x,θ) − t(x)] ≥ 0. The diﬃculty with this
view is that the principal’s payoﬀ from choosing a tariﬀ assignment t(·)
is given by the payoﬀ from the allocation (x(·),r(·)) implemented by t(·),
which is characterized by the global (rather than local) optimality conditions
x(θ) ∈ argmaxx[u(x,θ) − t(x)] and r(θ) = maxx[u(x,θ) − t(x)].
We will demonstrate that, as suggested by Goldman, Leland and Sibley
[9], this diﬃculty can be overcome by restricting the class of tariﬀ assign-
ments t(·) from which the principal can choose to those satisfying
t(x) = t(x) +
Z x
x
ux(˜ x,θ(˜ x))d˜ x (13)
for some increasing type assignment θ(·). To motivate (13), consider the case
in which it holds for a type assignment θ(·) which is continuous, strictly in-
creasing and satisﬁes θ(x) = θ and θ(x) = θ. The type assignment θ(·) then
has an inverse x(·). Because tx(x) = ux(x,θ(x)) for all x, the inverse x(·)
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition ux(x(θ),θ) − tx(x) = 0 for all θ. Further-
more, using the single-crossing property (1) of the agent’s utility function,
this ﬁrst order condition is suﬃcient to imply that x(θ) is the unique solution
to the problem maxx[u(x,θ) − t(x)] for all θ. Hence, the problem of identi-
fying the allocation (x(·),r(·)) implemented by t(·) is solved: the quantity
allocation x(·) is given by the inverse of the type assignment θ(·). The rent
allocation r(·) can then be determined from (5) and the initial condition
r(θ) = u(x,θ) − t(θ). The following subsection extends this argument to
general increasing type assignments and, more fundamentally, proves that
the taxation principle continues to hold when restricting attention to tariﬀ
assignments satisfying (13).















[ux(x,θ) + vx(x, ˜ θ)]f(˜ θ)d˜ θ. (16)
This extends Goldman, Leland and Sibley’s [9] formulation and is related to
the payoﬀ expression in Wilson’s [27] demand proﬁle approach. To motivate
(14), consider again the case in which θ(·) is continuous, strictly increasing
and satisﬁes the conditions θ(x) = θ and θ(x) = θ, so that the quantity
allocation x(·) implemented by t(·) is the inverse of θ(·). If the principal
assigns type θ to a quantity x, we may view the principal as providing type
θ of the agent with the minimum quantity x and with the additional marginal
units up to quantity x. The term V (x) + t(x) then reﬂects the principal’s
payoﬀ from providing all types with x at tariﬀ t(x). The increment in the
principal’s payoﬀ from providing the marginal unit x is given by s(x,θ): ﬁrst,
as x(·) is increasing, all types ˜ θ > θ are provided with the marginal unit x,
explaining the range of integration in (16). Second, the principal will provide
the marginal unit x at a price (marginal tariﬀ) equal to type θ’s willingness
to pay for the marginal unit, given by ux(x,θ), whereas the direct eﬀect on
the principal’s utility of providing type ˜ θ with the marginal unit x is given by
vx(x, ˜ θ). In the following we will refer to s(·) as the principal’s marginal proﬁt
function. Subsection 4.2 proves, for any increasing type assignment θ(·) and
corresponding tariﬀ t(·) given by (13), that (14) is indeed the principal’s
payoﬀ from any allocation implemented by t(·).
This discussion suggests the following reformulation of the principal’s






t(x) = t(x) +
Z x
x
ux(˜ x,θ(˜ x))d˜ x, ∀x, (19)
and the participation constraint
max
x [u(x,θ) − t(x)] ≥ 0, ∀θ. (20)
We refer to the program (17)–(20) as the assignment problem. Noting
the formal analogy between the characterization of incentive compatible
allocations in Lemma 1 and the requirement that (13) holds for an increasing
type assignment, we oﬀer
10Deﬁnition 1 An assignment (θ(·),t(·)) is incentive compatible if (18)–(19)
hold.
An assignment is feasible if it satisﬁes (18)–(20). An assignment is optimal
if it solves the assignment problem. A type assignment or tariﬀ assignment
is optimal if it is part of an optimal assignment.
In the following subsection we prove that the assignment problem is
equivalent to the allocation problem.
4.2 Equivalence
We ﬁnd it convenient to build on the intuition presented after the state-
ment of (13): if (θ(·),t(·)) is incentive compatible, then t(·) implements an
allocation (x(·),r(·)) characterized by the conditions that x(·) is an inverse
of θ(·) and r(x) = u(x,θ) − t(x). In making this intuition precise, we must
accommodate the possibility that an increasing quantity allocation x(·) may
have gaps (i.e., upward discontinuities) and bunches (i.e., intervals on which
the function is constant), and may not satisfy the conditions x(θ) = x and
x(θ) = x. As a result, we must work with an appropriately generalized
version of an inverse.
For every increasing quantity allocation x(·), let the correspondence X :






where we adopt the convention limψ↑θ x(ψ) = x and limψ↓θ x(ψ) = x. We
say that two quantity allocations are equivalent if they give rise to the
same correspondence X(·): replacing x(θ) with any value from the interval
[limψ↑θ x(ψ),limψ↓θ x(ψ)] yields a diﬀerent but equivalent quantity alloca-
tion.3







where we adopt the convention that limy↑x θ(y) = θ and limy↓x θ(y) = θ. We
say that two type assignments are equivalent if they give rise to the same
correspondence Θ(·).
3Note that if (x(·),r(·)) is incentive compatible then (x
0(·),r(·)) is incentive compatible
if and only if x
0(·) is equivalent to x(·). Furthermore if x
0(·) is equivalent to x(·) then the
principal’s payoﬀs from the incentive compatible allocations (x(·),r(·)) and (x
0(·),r(·)) are
identical.
11Deﬁnition 2 An increasing quantity allocation x(·) and an increasing type
assignment θ(·) are inverse if
x ∈ X(θ) ⇔ θ ∈ Θ(x).
An incentive compatible allocation (x(·),r(·)) and an incentive compatible
assignment (θ(·),t(·)) are consistent if x(·) and θ(·) are inverse and
r(θ) = u(x,θ) − t(x). (22)
Noticing that every increasing quantity allocation x(·) has an inverse, as
does every increasing type assignment θ(·), we obtain:
Lemma 2 If the allocation (x(·),r(·)) is incentive compatible, then there ex-
ists an incentive compatible assignment (θ(·),t(·)) such that (x(·),r(·)) and
(θ(·),t(·)) are consistent. If the assignment (θ(·),t(·)) is incentive compati-
ble, then there exists an incentive compatible allocation (x(·),r(·)) such that
(x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) are consistent.
Diﬀerent inverses of a given quantity allocation (resp. type assignment) must
be equivalent. Hence, Lemma 2 implies that, up to equivalences, consistency
establishes a bijection between the set of incentive compatible allocations
and the set of incentive compatible assignments.
The following Lemma shows that if (x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) are con-
sistent then the tariﬀ assignment t(·) implements the allocation (x(·),r(·)).
In conjunction with the ﬁrst sentence of Lemma 2, this establishes that the
taxation principle holds when attention is restricted to tariﬀ assignments
satisfying (13) (for an increasing type assignment θ(·)).4
Lemma 3 If (x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) are consistent, then:
X(θ) = argmax
x [u(x,θ) − t(x)], ∀θ (23)
r(θ) = max
x [u(x,θ) − t(x)], ∀θ. (24)
In particular, (x(·),r(·)) is feasible in the allocation problem if and only if
(θ(·),t(·)) is feasible in the assignment problem.
4We note that arguments analogous to the ones establishing Lemma 3 show that if
(x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) are consistent, then
t(x) = max
θ
[u(x,θ) − r(θ)], ∀x.
For the special case in which u(x,θ) = xθ, functions r(θ) and t(x) are then Fenchel
conjugates of one another (Rockafellar [22, Section 12]).
12It remains to show that if (θ(·),t(·)) and (x(·),r(·)) are consistent, then
the associated payoﬀs are identical. From Lemma 3, we can then con-
clude that if (x(·),r(·)) is implemented by t(·), then the former’s payoﬀ
is Π(θ(·),t(·)).
Lemma 4 Let (x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) be consistent. Then
Π(θ(·),t(·)) = Γ(x(·),r(·)).
We now have all the pieces required to establish the equivalence between
the allocation and the assignment problem.
Proposition 1 An allocation (x∗(·),r∗(·)) is optimal if and only if it is
consistent with an optimal assignment (θ∗(·),t∗(·)).
5 Reducing the Assignment Problem
In this section we investigate the circumstances under which we can reduce
the assignment problem to a maximization over type assignments, parallel-
ing the reduction procedure for the allocation problem outlined in Section
3.1. The ﬁrst subsection shows that this is possible whenever the agent’s
utility function satisﬁes a property we call the minmax property. The second
subsection demonstrates that the class of principal-agent models satisfying
this condition is signiﬁcantly broader than the class of models in which the
agent’s utility function is monotonic in type.
5.1 The Minmax Property
To motivate the subsequent analysis, suppose we can ﬁnd a quantity y ∈
[x,x] and a transfer m such that an incentive compatible assignment is
feasible in the assignment problem if and only if t(y) ≤ m. For any given in-
creasing type assignment θ(·), it is in the principal’s interest to maximize the
expected transfer received from the agent, and thus (from (19)) the payoﬀ
maximizing tariﬀ assignment should be given by t(x) = m+
R x
y ux(˜ x,θ(˜ x))d˜ x.
This reduces the principal’s problem to the choice of an increasing type as-
signment.
The following Lemma provides the representation of the principal’s pay-
oﬀ required for the formulation of this reduced problem (the case y = x
corresponds to (14)).







s(x,θ(x))dx + V (y) + t(y) (25)





vx(˜ θ,x) + ux(θ,x)
i
f(˜ θ)d˜ θ. (26)
The function b(·) may again be interpreted as a marginal proﬁt function,
representing the principal’s payoﬀ of obtaining the marginal unit x from
type θ and all lower types at a price corresponding to type θ0s marginal
willingness to pay.
To identify a candidate transfer m and quantity y for which an incentive
compatible assignment is feasible if and only if t(y) ≤ m, deﬁne
ˆ u(x) = min
θ
u(x,θ).
Because maxx [u(x,θ) − t(x)] ≥ u(y,θ) − t(y) ≥ ˆ u(y) − t(y) holds for all θ
and y, for any choice of y the condition
t(y) ≤ ˆ u(y) (27)
is suﬃcient for an incentive compatible assignment (θ(·),t(·)) to be feasible.
Suppose now that (27) is also necessary for feasibility, that is every incentive
compatible assignment satisfying (20) also satisﬁes (27). We then have the
situation described in the opening paragraph of this subsection, with m =
ˆ u(y).
We are thus led to investigate the circumstances under which, for some
appropriate choice of y, every increasing type assignment must satisfy t(y) ≤
ˆ u(y). The following deﬁnition identiﬁes a property of a type assignment
which is key for this purpose.
Deﬁnition 3 An increasing type assignment θ(·) satisﬁes the minmax prop-
erty at y if there exists θ ∈ Θ(y) such that u(y,θ) = ˆ u(y).
The signiﬁcance of the minmax property (and its name) is due to the
following result.
Lemma 6 Let (θ(·),t(·)) be incentive compatible and let θ(·) satisfy the min-




x [u(x,θ) − t(x)] = ˆ u(y) − t(y).
In particular, (θ(·),t(·)) is feasible if and only if t(y) ≤ ˆ u(y).
14If every increasing type assignment satisﬁes the minmax property at
the same value y∗, then Lemma 6 implies that every incentive compatible
assignment satisﬁes the participation constraint if and only if t(y∗) ≤ ˆ u(y∗).
We thus obtain:
Proposition 2 Suppose there exists y∗ such that every increasing type as-
signment satisﬁes the minmax property at y∗. Then θ∗(·) is optimal if and









The corresponding optimal tariﬀ assignment is given by
t∗(x) = ˆ u(y∗) +
Z x
y∗
ux(˜ x,θ∗(˜ x))d˜ x. (29)
Our next proposition replaces the assumption that every increasing type
assignment satisﬁes the minmax property at the same y∗ with the following
weaker condition:
Assumption 1 The agent’s utility function satisﬁes the minmax property,
in the sense that every increasing type assignment satisﬁes the minmax prop-
erty at some y.
Assumption 1 ensures that an optimal type assignment satisﬁes t(y∗) ≤
ˆ u(y∗) for some value y∗. Solving the reduced problem (28) will still generate
an optimal type assignment, as replacing the participation constraint (20)
by t(y∗) ≤ ˆ u(y∗) does not aﬀect the feasibility of the optimal assignment








s(x,θ(x))dx + V (y) + ˆ u(y).
Then, from Lemma 5, W(y) is the value of the assignment problem when
its participation constraint is replaced by the constraint t(y) ≤ ˆ u(y). Be-
cause the latter constraint is suﬃcient for the participation constraint, W(y)
cannot exceed the value of the assignment problem. But the value of the
assignment problem must be W(y∗), as an optimal type assignment solves
the reduced problem given y∗. Hence, we can identify y∗ as a maximizer of
W(y):
15Proposition 3 Let Assumption 1 hold. Then θ∗(·) is an optimal type as-









The corresponding optimal tariﬀ assignment is given by (29).
The important implication of Assumption 1 is that optimal type assignments
satisfy the minmax property at some y. Proposition 3 would hold with this
weaker requirement. Notice in addition that, from Propositions 2 and 3, if
every increasing type assignment satisﬁes the minmax property at y∗, then
y∗ maximizes W(y).
5.2 Verifying the Minmax Property
This section presents cases in which the agent’s utility function satisﬁes the
minmax property. We begin with models with a value y∗ at which every
increasing type assignment satisﬁes the minmax property.
Suppose ﬁrst that the agent’s utility is increasing in type, as in monopoly
pricing problems. It then follows that ˆ u(x) = u(x,θ). Since θ ∈ Θ(x) holds
for every increasing type assignment, this is suﬃcient to imply that every
increasing type assignment satisﬁes the minmax property at y∗ = x. We
may then apply Proposition 2 to conclude that an assignment is optimal if






The corresponding optimal tariﬀ assignment can then be calculated from
(29). This corresponds to the solution procedure proposed by Goldman,
Leland and Sibley [9] to solve the nonlinear pricing problem of a monopolist.
Note that reducing the assignment problem does not require the additional
technical assumptions imposed by Goldman, Leland and Sibley.
The case in which the agent’s utility function is decreasing in type, as
in regulation problems, is similar. Here we have ˆ u(x) = u(x,θ). Since
every increasing type assignment satisﬁes θ ∈ Θ(x), it satisﬁes the minmax
property at y∗ = x. Applying Proposition 2, an optimal type assignment






16Proposition 2 is also applicable whenever the agent’s utility function
satisﬁes the condition that there exists y ∈ [x,x] such that
u(y,θ) = u(y,ψ) for all θ,ψ. (30)
It is then immediate that ˆ u(y) = u(y,θ) holds for all θ and, thus, every
increasing type assignment satisﬁes the minmax property at y∗ = y. When
(30) holds for y = x or y = x, we have the special case of a monopoly or
regulation setting, where the agent’s utility function is monotonic in type.
The more interesting case is the one in which condition (30) holds for y ∈
(x,x), implying that the agent’s utility function is non-monotonic in type.
A simple example is provided by (7)–(8), with x < 0 = y < x. Biais,
Martimort and Rochet [3] (see also Glosten [7, 8]) use a model with this
property to examine market making. Here, the principal is a market maker
who trades with the agent, either selling (x > 0) or buying (x < 0) quantity
x of the good. The quantity y = 0 ∈ (x,x) corresponds to the no-trade
outcome, satisfying u(0,θ) = 0 for all θ and thus verifying condition (30)
for an interior value of y. Condition (30) is also also satisﬁed in the model
of “inﬂexible rules” considered by Lewis and Sappington [15].5
The model in Lewis and Sappington [15] is a special case of a model
with countervailing incentives (Lewis and Sappington [16] and Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare [17]; also see Feenstra and Lewis [5]). As noted by Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare [17], the important structural property of Lewis and
Sappington’s model [16] of countervailing incentives is that the agent’s utility
function is quasi-convex in type. We can show that this implies the minmax
property:
Lemma 7 Suppose u(x,θ) is quasi-convex in θ. Then the agent’s utility
function satisﬁes the minmax property.
The intuition for this result begins by noting that, because the utility
function is quasi-convex in θ, the solution to minθ u(x,θ) is a convex set that
varies upper hemicontinuously in x. For any increasing type assignment
θ(·), the associated correspondence Θ(·) similarly gives convex sets that
vary upper hemicontinuously in x, with θ ∈ Θ(x) and θ ∈ Θ(x). The
5The agent’s utility function in Lewis and Sappington [15] is given by P − cQ + cK,
where P is a monetary transfer received by the agent, c is the type of the agent, Q ≥ 0 is
the production level and the constant K ≥ 0 is the installed capacity. Setting m = −P,
c = θ, x = −Q, and y = −K this corresponds to our formulation of the principal-agent
problem with u(x,θ) = θ(x − y), so that condition (30) is satisﬁed.
17two correspondences must then intersect for some y, at which the minmax
property holds.
It follows from Proposition 3 and Lemma 7 that when the agent’s utility
function is quasi-convex in θ, an assignment θ∗(·) is optimal if and only if
there exists y∗ with y∗ ∈ argmaxy W(y) such that θ∗(·) solves the reduced
problem (28). Notice that in contrast to the other cases discussed in this
subsection, determining the value y∗ which maximizes the value function
W(y) is non-trivial, as (in general) diﬀerent type assignments will satisfy
the minmax property at diﬀerent values of y. We return to the issue of
maximizing W(y) in Section 6.1, after having introduced an assumption
suﬃcient to decompose the reduced problem.
Provided the agent’s utility function is continuous and satisﬁes the single-
crossing property (as we assume throughout), the proof of Lemma 7 shows
that it satisﬁes the minmax property if the set argminθ u(x,θ) is convex-
valued for all x ∈ (x,x). It is not diﬃcult to see that this condition is also
necessary for Assumption 1 to hold. In particular, the agent’s utility function
violates the minmax property if it is strictly quasi-concave in θ and satisﬁes
u(x,θ) > u(x,θ) and u(x,θ) > u(x,θ). Examples in which the agent’s utility
function is strictly quasi-concave in θ are discussed and solved by Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare [17] and Jullien [13]. In these examples optimal allocations
have the property that quantity allocations are strictly increasing and the
participation constraint binds for more than one type. It follows that not
only Assumption 1, but also the characterization of optimal assignments in
Proposition 3 (which only requires that optimal type assignments satisfy the
minmax property), fails.6
6 Decomposing the Assignment Problem
This section ﬁrst provides conditions under which the problem of determin-
ing an optimal assignment can be decomposed into a collection of pointwise
maximization problems. We then show that if these conditions are satis-
ﬁed, the assignment approach yields a simple characterization of optimal
bunching.
6Suppose an assignment satisﬁes (29) for some y
∗ and that θ1 < θ2 satisfy
maxx[u(x,θ1) − t(x)] = maxx[u(x,θ2) − t(x)] = 0. It then follows that y
∗ is an opti-
mal choice for types θ1 and θ2. The strict single-crossing property (1) of the agent’s
utility function then implies y
∗ is the unique optimal choice for all types θ ∈ (θ1,θ2), so
that any allocation implemented by the given assignment fails to be strictly increasing, a
contradiction.
186.1 Pointwise Maximization
The monotonicity constraint in the reduced assignment problem (28) may
be ignored if the pointwise maximization of the marginal proﬁt functions
b(·) and s(·) with respect to θ yields an increasing type assignment. To deal









A suﬃcient condition for both θs(·) and θb(·) to be increasing is that
the single-crossing conditions sxθ(·) ≥ 0 and bxθ(·) ≥ 0 are satisﬁed. To
simplify the subsequent characterization of optimal assignments, we require
strict single crossing.
Assumption 2 The marginal proﬁt functions s(·) and b(·) satisfy the strict
single-crossing property, that is
sxθ(x,θ) = −[uxx(x,θ) + vxx(x,θ)]f(θ) + [1 − F(θ)]uxxθ(x,θ) > 0, (31)
bxθ(x,θ) = −[uxx(x,θ) + vxx(x,θ)]f(θ) − F(θ)uxxθ(x,θ) > 0, (32)
holds for all x,θ.
Assumption 2 can be interpreted in terms of the virtual surplus func-
tions. A straightforward calculation gives sxθ(x,θ) = −σxx(x,θ)f(θ), so
that condition (31) is equivalent to σxx(·) > 0, i.e. the virtual surplus σ(·)
is strictly concave in x. Similarly, bxθ(x,θ) = −βxx(x,θ)f(θ), again linking
the strict single-crossing property of the marginal proﬁt function b(·) to the
strict concavity of the virtual surplus function β(·). Note that in the com-
monly studied case in which the agent’s utility function satisﬁes uxxθ(·) = 0,
requiring uxx(·) < 0 and vxx(·) < 0 is suﬃcient for Assumption 2 (with no
assumptions on the distribution of θ). More generally, the absolute value of












7The maximum theorem implies that argmaxθ s(x,θ) and argmaxθ s(x,θ) are compact,
ensuring that the following is well-deﬁned. Notice also that any other selection from
argmaxθ x(x,θ) or argmaxθ b(x,θ) would yield an equivalent type assignment.
19Diﬀerentiating the marginal proﬁt functions (16) and (26), we have
sθ(x,θ) = −[uxx(x,θ) + vxx(x,θ)] − (1 − F(θ))uxθ(x,θ)
bθ(x,θ) = −[uxx(x,θ) + vxx(x,θ)] + F(θ)uxθ(x,θ),
and thus sθ(y,θ)−bθ(y,θ) > 0 (since uxθ(y,θ) > 0). It follows that θs(y) ≥
θb(y) for all x, with strict inequality unless both values lie on the boundary.
Hence, the reduced problem (28) can be decomposed if θb(·) and θs(·) are
both increasing, which follows from Assumption 2. In addition, the strict
inequalities in Assumption 2 imply that (up to equivalence) the optimal type
assignment θ∗(·) is unique:
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed and let y∗ ∈




θb(x), if x ≤ y∗
θs(x), if x > y∗ . (33)
Our assumptions do not preclude the possibility that W(y) has multiple
maximizers. However, Proposition 4 implies that all the assignments con-
structed according to (33) for some y∗ ∈ argmaxy W(y) are equivalent, so
that the choice of maximizer is irrelevant in identifying the optimal type
assignment.
If all type assignments are known to satisfy the minmax property at the
same y∗, then y∗ maximizes W(y) (cf. Propositions 2 and 3) and the optimal
type assignment has been identiﬁed.8 In general, a two-step procedure allows
us to identify y∗ and hence an optimal type assignment. First, determine







s(x,θs(x))dx + V (y) + ˆ u(y).
This allows us to calculate the derivative Wy(·) (when it exists). Second,
our next result demonstrates that under Assumption 2, a suitable gener-
alization of the ﬁrst order condition Wy(y∗) = 0 always characterizes the
maxima of the value function, even though W(·) need not be concave. The
generalization is required because W(·) need not be diﬀerentiable and the
maximization may have boundary solutions.
8Note that in this case, requiring (31) only for x ≥ y
∗ and (32) only for x ≤ y
∗
instead of Assumption 2 suﬃces for Proposition 4. In particular, if u(·) is increasing
(resp. decreasing), in type then (31) (resp. (32)) is suﬃcient.
20To state the result, let the type assignment ˆ θ(·) satisfy u(y, ˆ θ(y)) = ˆ u(y)
for all y. Due to the single-crossing property of the agent’s utility function,
the type assignment ˆ θ(·) is decreasing (in contrast to all the other type
assignment considered in this paper). In analogy with (21), which applies to
increasing type assignments, let ˆ Θ : [x,x] → [θ,θ] denote the correspondence
deﬁned by





where we adopt the convention that limy↓x ˆ θ(y) = θ and limy↑x ˆ θ(y) = θ.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 2 is satisﬁed. Then y∗ ∈ argmaxW(y)




− [s(y∗,θs(y∗)) − s(y∗,ψ)] = 0. (34)
To interpret this result, consider y ∈ (x,x) and suppose that the solution
of the problem minθ u(y,θ) is unique and thus given by ˆ θ(y). Then W(·) is





+ Vx(y) + ux(y, ˆ θ(y),
which can be rewritten (cf. the proof of Proposition 5) as
Wy(y) =
h




s(y,θs(y)) − s(y, ˆ θ(y))
i
.
Condition (34) thus generalizes the ﬁrst order condition Wy(y∗) = 0 by
replacing ˆ θ(y) with a value θ ∈ ˆ Θ(y) when the former is not unique.
Example. Continuing with the example in which utility functions are
given by (7)–(8), we have already noted in Section 5.2 that every increasing
type assignment satisﬁes the minmax property at 0. This allows us to reduce









Notice that this contrasts with the standard approach based on the analysis
of the allocation problem, where we needed x = 0 or x = 0 to do the
equivalent reduction (cf. Section 3.1). Because
sxθ(x,θ) = bxθ(x,θ) = (γ + β)f(θ) > 0,
Assumption 2 is satisﬁed, so we can proceed with the pointwise maximiza-
tion, without (again in contrast to the standard approach) requiring the
distribution function to satisfy conditions (11) and (12). ||
216.2 Optimal Bunching
Bunching refers to a situation in which the same quantity is allocated to mul-
tiple types or, equivalently, multiple types are assigned to the same quantity:
Deﬁnition 4 An increasing type assignment θ(·) has the bunch Θ(x) at x
if Θ(x) 6= {θ(x)}.
Throughout this subsection we impose Assumptions 1 and 2. Under
these assumptions, the characterization of optimal bunches is immediate
from the characterization of optimal type assignments in Propositions 4 and
5. Three kinds of bunches may arise in the optimal type assignment θ∗(·)
given by (33).
First, there may be (trivial) bunches at the boundaries x or x, occurring
whenever it is optimal for the principal to assign an interior type to these
boundaries, i.e. θ∗(x) > θ or θ∗(x) < θ.
Second, there may be bunches at interior quantities x ∈ (x,x) with
x 6= y∗. Since the correspondences deﬁned by maxθ s(x,θ) and maxθ b(x,θ),
are upper hemi-continuous, such bunches occur if and only if, at quantity x,
the relevant marginal proﬁt function s(x,·) (if x > y∗) or b(x,·) (if x < y∗)
has multiple maximizers, causing an upwards discontinuity in θs(·) or θb(·) at
x. In particular, such bunches do not arise if the marginal proﬁt functions are
strictly quasiconcave in θ. Similarly, bunches at interior quantities x 6= y∗
are also excluded if the virtual surplus functions σ(·) and β(·) satisfy the
strict single-crossing property.9
Third, if y∗ ∈ (x,x), then there is an optimal bunch at y∗, given by
[θb(y∗),θs(y∗)], if and only if θb(y∗) < θs(y∗). Because sθ(x,θ) − bθ(x,θ) =
uxθ(x,θ) > 0, the case θb(y∗) = θs(y∗) ∈ (θ,θ) cannot arise and there must
be a bunch at y∗ unless θb(y∗) = θs(y∗) = θ or θb(y∗) = θs(y∗) = θ.10 A
simple suﬃcient for the existence of an optimal bunch at y∗ is then given by
sθ(y∗,θ) ≤ 0 ≤ bθ(y∗,θ) or, equivalently,
ux(y∗,θ) + vx(y∗,θ) ≥ 0 ≥ ux(y∗,θ) + vx(y∗,θ).
9Suppose σxθ(·) > 0. Then for every x there is at most one solution to the ﬁrst order
condition sθ(x,θ) = −σx(x,θ)f(θ) = 0 and, if such a solution exists, it is a maximizer of
s(x,θ). Consequently the solution to the problem maxθ s(x,θ) is unique. An equivalent
argument applies to b(·).




s(x) = x holds for all x ≤ y
∗). In the second of these cases
it is identical to θ
b(·) (because θ
s(x) = θ
b(x) = θ holds for all x ≥ y
∗). Vice versa,
whenever there exists an optimal type assignment which is not equivalent to θ
b(·) or θ
s(·),
it must have a bunch at y
∗ (which then must be the unique maximizer of W(·), as two
type assignments satisfying (33) for two diﬀerent values of y
∗ can then not be equivalent).
22This condition can be interpreted in terms of the ﬁrst-best quantity alloca-
tion xFB(·) given by a solution of maxx[u(x,θ)+v(x,θ)]. Because Assump-
tion 2 implies that total surplus u(x,θ) + v(x,θ) is strictly concave in x for
θ = θ and θ = θ, the optimal quantity assignment must have a bunch at y∗
whenever xFB(θ) ≤ y∗ ≤ xFB(θ).
Example. To illustrate our characterization of optimal bunching at y∗,
we continue with our running example. Suppose x < 0 < x and, as in the
model of market making from Biais, Martimort and Rochet [3], θ < 0 < θ.
Assume, in addition, α < 1. Straightforward calculation yields
sθ(0,θ) = −(1 − α)θf(θ) + (1 − F(θ)),
bθ(0,θ) = −(1 − α)θf(θ) − F(θ).
Noting that sθ(0,θ) > 0 for all θ ≤ 0 and sθ(0,θ) < 0, it follows that
θs(0) ∈ (0,θ). Similarly, it follows that θb(0) ∈ (θ,0). In particular, we have
θb(0) < θs(0) and the optimal type assignment thus has a bunch at y∗ = 0.
This bunch contains type θ = 0, but never consumes all types. Interpreting
y∗ = 0 as the no-trade outcome, implementing the no-trade allocation is
not an optimal choice for the principal (in contrast to some of the examples
considered in Glosten [8]). ||
A standard result from the application of optimal control techniques to
solve the allocation problem is that optimal bunches at interior quantities
satisfy the condition that the average of the marginal virtual surpluses over
a bunch must be equal to zero (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole
[6, Chapter 7, Appendix]). Obtaining optimal bunches as the solution to
pointwise, unconstrained maximiation problems provides a simple, alterna-
tive interpretation of this optimality condition. Consider ﬁrst the case of
an optimal bunch Θ∗(x) = [θ1,θ2] at x ∈ (y∗,x). As both θ1 and θ2 are








where the second equality uses the identity sθ(x,θ) = −σx(x,θ)f(θ). Simi-








In each case, the average of the marginal virtual surpluses is zero.
23For the case of an optimal bunch at y∗ ∈ (x,x), given by Θ∗(y∗) =
[θb(y∗),θs(y∗)], a corresponding characterization follows from Proposition 5.












Hence, we may rewrite the generalized ﬁrst order condition (34) in terms of







again corresponding to the condition that—for an appropriate choice of
ψ ∈ ˆ Θ(y∗)—the average of the marginal virtual surpluses over the types
in the bunch is equal to zero. Note that the issue of choosing ψ is moot if
the agent’s utility function is strictly quasi-concave in θ (as in the model
of countervailing incentives from Lewis and Sappington [16]). Then the so-
lution to minθ u(y∗,θ) is unique and thus ˆ Θ(y∗) = {ˆ θ(y∗)}, with the above
condition holding for ψ = ˆ θ(y∗).
7 Discussion
We have identiﬁed a class of decomposable principal-agent models, in which
a solution can be obtained from a collection of unconstrained pointwise maxi-
mization problems. Our approach relies on ﬁrst reformulating the principal’s
problem as an equivalent assignment problem. We then demonstrate that
this assignment problem can be decomposed if the agent’s utility function
satisﬁes the minmax property and the marginal proﬁt functions satisfy the
strict single-crossing property, assumptions that are satisﬁed for many inter-
esting speciﬁcations of the principal-agent model. The ability to solve such
models by pointwise maximization leads to a simple and intuitive interpre-
tation of the conditions characterizing optimal bunching.
Throughout the paper, we have restricted attention to one-dimensional,
quasi-linear principal-agent models in which the agent’s utility function sat-
isﬁes the strict single-crossing condition. There appears to be little prospect
for decomposing more complicated problems. Rochet and Stole [26] dis-
cuss the diﬃculties that arise in multidimensional models, while Araujo and
24Moreira [1] work without the single-crossing property. At the same time,
the heart of the assignment approach—the transformation of the problem
into a maximization over assignments, with its accompanying intuition—will
generalize. For example, as suggested by the analysis in Goldman, Leland
and Sibley [9], there is good reason to believe that the assignment approach
should prove useful in examining models without quasi-linear utilities.
Our requirement that every increasing type assignment satisfy the min-
max property can be trivially weakened to the requirement that the property
hold for optimal type assignments. Because the minmax property plays a
central role in our elimination of the participation constraint from the prin-
cipal’s problem, there appears to be little scope for further weakening.
The exposition is simpliﬁed considerably by requiring strict single cross-
ing in Assumption 2, but much of the analysis carries over to the case of
weak single crossing. The type assignment identiﬁed in Proposition 4 re-
mains optimal and Proposition 5 remains unchanged. If the optimal type
assignment is unique (see Jullien [13, Theorem 4] for suﬃcient conditions
for uniqueness), then we also have the necessary implication of Proposition
4. Finally, the optimality of the type assignment given by Proposition 4
obtains whenever the relevant type assignments are increasing. This will
hold under alternative conditions, such as the strict quasi-concavity of both
the virtual surplus and marginal proﬁt functions.
Our goal has been to identify conditions under which the principal-agent
problem is simple, in the sense that it is decomposable. Whereas it is stan-
dard that the single-crossing property of the agent’s utility function suﬃces
to replace global constraints by local ones, we end up with no constraints at
all. It is thus not surprising that the class of principal-agent problems we
identify as simple must satisfy additional conditions. What is surprising is
that these conditions are much less stringent than the ones that have been
previously identiﬁed in the literature.
258 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Proposition 1 in Rochet [25] shows that there exists
r(·) such that the allocation (x(·),r(·)) is incentive compatible if and only
if x(·) is increasing. The characterization of r(·) is from Theorem 2, in
conjunction with footnote 10, in Milgrom and Segal [20]. ||
Proof of Lemma 2. Let (x(·),r(·)) be incentive compatible. Then x(·) is
increasing (Lemma 1). Let Φ : [x,x] → [θ,θ] be the correspondence deﬁned
by
Φ(x) = {θ | x ∈ X(θ)}, ∀x.
By construction X(·) satisﬁes ∪θX(θ) = [x,x], and hence Φ(x) is non-
empty for all x. In addition, Φ(x) is convex-valued. It is also increasing
(i.e., θ1 ∈ Φ(x1) and θ2 ∈ Φ(x2) implies θ1 ≤ θ2 if x1 < x2): otherwise,
there exists x1 > x2 with Φ(x1) 3 θ1 < θ2 ∈ Φ(x2), and hence with
x1 ∈ X(θ1) and x2 ∈ X(θ2), contradicting the fact that x(·) is increas-
ing. Let θ(·) be a selection from Φ(·) (and hence increasing), and note that
any such selection gives Θ(·) = Φ(·). (Because Φ(·) is increasing, we have
limy↑x θ(y) = limy↑x θ0(y) for any selections θ(·) and θ0(·), with a similar
equality for limy↓x θ(·), which combines with the convex-valuedness of Φ(·)
to suﬃce for the result.) Hence, x(·) and θ(·) are inverses. Letting t(·)
be given by (13) with t(x) = u(x,θ(x)) − r(x), the assignment (θ(·),t(·))
is incentive compatible, and (x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) are consistent. An
analogous argument establishes the second statement in the lemma. ||
Proof of Lemma 3. Let (x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) be consistent. Then
(θ(·),t(·)) is incentive compatible which, as we show below, implies
y ∈ argmax
x [u(x,θ) − t(x)] ⇔ θ ∈ Θ(y). (35)
Because x(·) and θ(·) are inverse, (35) implies (23). Let the rent allocation
ρ(·) be given by
ρ(θ) = u(x(θ),θ) − t(x(θ)).
From (23) we have
ρ(θ) = max
x [u(x,θ) − t(x)] ≥ u(x(ψ),θ) − t(x(ψ)), ∀θ,ψ.
Using the identity t(x(ψ)) = u(x(ψ),ψ)−ρ(ψ), it follows that the allocation
(x(·),ρ(·)) satisﬁes (2) and thus is incentive compatible. From Lemma 1,
26it then suﬃces to show ρ(θ) = r(θ) to conclude ρ(·) = r(·), thus yielding
(24). As θ ∈ Θ(x), (35) implies ρ(θ) = u(x,θ)−t(x). Thus, the consistency
condition (22) yields ρ(θ) = r(θ), as desired. Because (x(·),r(·)) is incentive
compatible, it is feasible in the allocation problem if and only if (6) holds.
Similarly, because (θ(·),t(·)) is incentive compatible it is feasible in the as-
signment problem if and only if (20) holds. From (24) the participation
constraints (6) and (20) are equivalent, implying the statement in the last
sentence of the Lemma.
It remains to establish (35). Using (13) and the identity u(y,θ) −
u(x,θ) =
R y
x ux(˜ x,θ)d˜ x we have
[u(y,θ) − u(x,θ)] − [t(y) − t(x)] =
Z y
x






uxθ(˜ x, ˜ θ)d˜ θ
#
d˜ x. (36)
As θ(·) is increasing, the strict single-crossing property (1) implies that for
x < y the right side of (36) is positive if and only if θ(x) ≤ θ, whereas for
x > y the right side of (36) is positive if and only if θ(x) ≥ y. Thus
[u(y,θ) − u(x,θ)] − [t(y) − t(x)] ≥ 0, ∀x ⇔ lim
x→yθ(x) ≤ y ≤ limx↓yθ(x).
(37)
Noting that the right side of (37) is equivalent to y ∈ argmaxx[u(x,θ)−t(x)]
and the left side is equivalent to θ ∈ Θ(y), (35) follows. ||
Proof of Lemma 4. Let (x(·),r(·)) and (θ(·),t(·)) be consistent. Because





v(x(θ),θ) + u(x(θ),θ) −
"Z θ
θ
uθx(˜ θ), ˜ θ)d˜ θ
##
f(θ)dθ−r(θ).
Using integration by parts (for the ﬁrst equality) and a straightforward
















dθ + V (x) + u(x,θ) − r(θ).
27Because x(·) and θ(·) are inverses, we can apply Fubini’s theorem to the








dx + V (x) + u(x,θ) − r(θ).









s(x,θ(x))dx + u(x,θ) − r(θ) = Π(θ(·),t(·)),
where the ﬁnal equality uses t(x) = u(x,θ) − r(θ). ||
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (x∗(·),r∗(·)) be an optimal allocation and
let (θ∗(·),t∗(·)) be consistent with it (the existence of such an assignment is
ensured by Lemma 2). From Lemma 3 the assignment (θ∗(·),t∗(·)) is feasible.
Let θ(·),t(·)) be any feasible assignment. By Lemma 2 there exists an alloca-
tion (x(·),r(·)) consistent with it. From Lemma 3 the allocation (x(·),r(·)) is
feasible. From the optimality of (x∗(·),r∗(·)) we then have Γ(x∗(·),r∗(·)) ≥
Γ(x(·),r(·)). Applying Lemma 4 this implies Π(θ∗(·),t∗(·)) ≥ Π(θ(·),t(·)).
Hence, (θ∗(·),t∗(·)) is optimal. The argument for the reverse implication is
analogous. ||

























[s(x,θ(x)) − Vx(x) − ux(x,θ(x))]dx +
Z x
y







s(x,θ(x))dx + V (y) + t(y),
where the ﬁrst equality reproduces (14), the second applies (13) and the
fourth is by straightforward calculation using the deﬁnitions (15), (16) and
(26). ||
28Proof of Lemma 6. Let (θ(·),t(·)) be incentive compatible and let θ(·)
satisfy the minmax property at y. We then have (cf. (35) in the proof of
Lemma 3)
y ∈ argmax
x [u(x,θ) − t(x)],∀θ ∈ Θ(y). (38)
Now, let ˆ θ ∈ Θ(y) be a type such that ˆ u(y) = u(y, ˆ θ). From (38) we then
have
ˆ u(y) − t(y) = max
x
h





x [u(x,θ) − t(x)] (39)
and from ˆ u(x) = minθ u(x,θ) we have
ˆ u(y) − t(y) = min
θ
[u(y,θ) − t(y)] ≤ min
θ
max
x [u(x,θ) − t(x)]. (40)
Combining the inequalities in (39) and (40) yields minθ maxx [u(x,θ) − t(x)] =
ˆ u(y) − t(y). Because the function maxx [u(x,θ) − t(x)] is continuous in θ,




x [u(x,θ) − t(x)] ≥ 0,
implying the equivalence in the last sentence of the statement of the Lemma.
||
Proof of Proposition 2. If every increasing type assignment satisﬁes the
minmax property at y∗, it follows from Lemma 6 that an incentive compat-
ible assignment (θ(·),t(·)) satisﬁes (20) if and only if t(y∗) ≤ ˆ u(y∗). Hence,
using (25) to rewrite the objective function of the assignment problem, an








s(x,θ(x)dx + V (y∗) + t(y∗)
subject to (18)–(19) and t(y∗) ≤ ˆ u(y∗). The result is then immediate upon
noticing that in a solution to this problem the constraint t(y∗) ≤ ˆ u(y∗) must
be satisﬁed with equality. ||
Proof of Proposition 3. Let (θ∗(·),t∗(·)) be an optimal assignment.
Then (θ∗(·),t∗(·)) is incentive compatible and thus θ∗(·) is increasing and, by
Assumption 1, satisﬁes the minmax property at some y∗. As the constraint
t(y∗) ≤ ˆ u(y∗) implies (20), it follows that θ∗(·) must solve (28) and that
t∗(·) is given by (29). Furthermore, we have Π(θ∗(·),t∗(·)) = W(y∗). Now
29suppose y∗ 6∈ argmaxW(y). Then there exists ˆ y such that W(ˆ y) > W(y∗).
Let ˆ θ(·) be a type assignment solving the problem in the deﬁnition of W(ˆ y)
and let
ˆ t(x) = ˆ u(ˆ y) +
Z x
ˆ y
ux(˜ x, ˆ θ(˜ x))d˜ x.
Then (ˆ θ(·),ˆ t(·)) is incentive compatible. As (ˆ θ(·),ˆ t(·)) satisﬁes t(ˆ y) ≤ ˆ u(y)
it also satisﬁes (20) and thus is feasible in the assignment problem. As
Π(ˆ θ(·)),ˆ t(·) = W(ˆ y) > W(y∗) this contradicts the optimality of (θ∗(·),t∗(·)),
implying the “only if” in the statement of the proposition.
Let y∗ ∈ argmaxW(y), let θ∗(·) solve (28) and let t∗(·) be given by
(29). By the same arguments as the ones just given for the assignment
(ˆ θ(·),ˆ t(·)), it follows that (θ∗(·),t∗(·)) is feasible in the assignment problem
and satisﬁes Π(θ∗(·),t∗(·)) = W(y∗). Now consider any other incentive
compatible assignment (θ(·),t(·)) satisfying (20). As θ(·) is increasing there
exists y such that θ(·) satisﬁes the minmax property at y. Thus (θ(·),t(·))
satisﬁes (18)– (19) and t(y) ≤ ˆ u(y), implying Π(θ(·),t(·)) ≤ W(y) ≤ W(y∗).
Consequently, (θ∗(·),t∗(·)) is optimal. ||
Proof of Lemma 7. Let θ(·) be an increasing type assignment. Deﬁne
the correspondence F : [x,x] → [θ,θ] by F(x) = {φ − ψ : φ ∈ Θ(x),ψ ∈
argminθ u(x,θ)}. Then F(x) is convex-valued (because Θ(x) is convex and
the quasiconvexity of u(x,θ) ensures that argminθ(u(x,θ) is convex), upper
hemicontinuous and compact (because Θ(·) is upper hemicontinuous and
compact-valued and, by the maximum theorem (Berge [4, Theorem 12.1]),
so is argminθ∈[θ,θ] u(x,θ)). In addition, minF(x) ≤ 0 (because θ ∈ Θ(x))
and maxF(x) ≥ 0 (because θ ∈ Θ(x)). Let maxF(x) < 0 and minF(x) > 0,
since otherwise we immediately have that the minmax property holds at






: z ∈ F(x)

if x ∈ [x,x] and by
G(x) =
(
G(x) if x > x
G(x) if x < x
is a nonempty, compact and convex-valued upper hemicontinuous correspon-
dence from [x−1,x+1] into itself,11 and hence has a ﬁxed point [4, Corollary
11Note that z ∈ F(x) ensures z/(θ − θ) ∈ [−1,1]. By assumption, maxF(x) < 0 and
hence G(x) > x, and minF(x) < 0 and hence G(x) > x.
3015.3 (Kakutani)]. By construction, such a ﬁxed point must occur at some
y ∈ (x,x) for which 0 ∈ F(y), and hence for which the minmax property
holds. ||
Proof of Proposition 4. We ﬁrst show that, under Assumption 2 and
































it follows that θ∗(·) solves (41) if it is increasing. From Theorem 4 in Milgrom
and Shannon ([19]), Assumption 2 implies that the functions θb(x) and θs(x)
are increasing. Hence, θ∗(·) is increasing (because, as argued in the text,
θb(y∗) ≤ θs(y∗)).
This establishes that for any y∗, the type assignment θ∗(·) given by
(33) solves (41). That (33) is optimal, given Assumption 1 and y∗ ∈
argmaxy W(y), then follows from Proposition 3, establishing the “if” por-
tion of Proposition 4.
Assumption 2 implies that the virtual surplus functions σ(·) and β(·)
are strictly concave in x (cf. the discussion following the statement of the
Assumption). It then follows from the proof of Theorem 4 in Jullien [13] that
(up to equivalence) the solution to the allocation problem (3)–(6) is unique.
From Proposition 1, the same is then true for the solution to the assignment
problem. Hence, if θ(·) is an optimal type assignment it is equivalent to
θ∗(·). ||
Proof of Proposition 5.
[Step 1] Let y ∈ [x,x]. From the opening argument in the proof of
Proposition 4, Assumption 2 implies that the type assignment θ(·) given by
θ(x) =
(
θb(x), if x ≤ y

















s(x,θs(x))dx + V (y) + ˆ u(y)
holds for all y. The ﬁrst three summands in this expression for W(y) are
continuously diﬀerentiable with derivative
b(y,θb(y)) − s(y,θs(y)) + Vx(y)
(where the continuity of the ﬁrst two terms is from Berge’s maximum theo-
rem [4, p. 64]). From Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal [20] we have




This term is then also absolutely continuous, ensuring that W(y) is an in-
deﬁnite integral:
W(y) = W(x) +
Z y
x
m(s, ˆ θ(s))ds, (42)
where
m(x,θ) = b(x,θb(x)) − s(x,θs(x)) + Vx(x) + ux(x,θ).
[Step 2] We now show that the function m(·) satisﬁes
m(y,θ) ≥ 0 ⇒ m(x,θ) ≥ 0, ∀x < y, (43)
m(y,θ) ≤ 0 ⇒ m(x,θ) ≤ 0, ∀x > y. (44)
To prove (43) – (44) we begin by noting that, as b(x,θb(x)) ≥ b(x,θs(x))
and s(x,θs(x)) ≥ s(x,θb(x)) we have
b(x,θb(x))−s(x,θb(x)) ≥ m(x,θ)−Vx(x)−ux(x,θ) ≥ b(x,θs(x))−s(x,θs(x)).
Using the identity
b(x,θ) − s(x,θ) = −Vx(x) − ux(x,θ), ∀x,θ, (45)
this implies
ux(x,θ) − ux(x,θb(x)) ≥ m(x,θ) ≥ ux(x,θ) − ux(x,θs(x)).
32Using the single-crossing property of the agent’s utility function we then
have
θ ≥ θs(x) ⇒ m(x,θ) ≥ 0, (46)
θ ≤ θb(x) ⇒ m(x,θ) ≤ 0. (47)
As θs(·) is increasing, θ ≥ θs(y) implies θ ≥ θs(x) for all x < y. Pro-
vided that the condition θ ≥ θs(y) is satisﬁed, (43) then follows from (46).
Similarly, (47) implies (44) provided the condition θ ≤ θb(y) is satisﬁed.
As θb(x) ≤ θs(x) holds for all x, it remains to establish (43) and (44) for
the case in which θb(y) < θ < θs(y). From (45) we have







S(x,θ) = [s(x,θs(x)) − s(x,θ)].
Now suppose θb(y) < θ < θs(y) and m(y,θ) ≥ 0. Let x < y. If θs(x) ≤ θ






where the second inequality is from the single-crossing property (32) of b(·)
and the inequality θb(y) < θ. Similarly,
S(y,θ) ≥ [s(y,θs(x)) − s(y,θ)] > S(x,θ),
where the second inequality is from the single-crossing property (31) of s(·)
and the inequality θs(x) > θ. Combining these inequalities, it follows from
(48) that m(x,θ) > m(y,θ) ≥ 0, thus establishing (43). The argument
establishing (44) for the case θb(y) < θ < θs(y) and m(y) ≤ 0 is analogous.
[Step 3] Because ˆ θ(·) is decreasing and mθ(y,θ) = uxθ(y,θ) > 0, (43)–
(44) imply
m(y,ψ) ≥ 0 ⇒ m(x, ˆ θ(x)) ≥ 0, ∀x < y,ψ ∈ ˆ Θ(y) (49)
m(y,ψ) ≤ 0 ⇒ m(x, ˆ θ(x)) ≤ 0, ∀x > y,ψ ∈ ˆ Θ(y). (50)
Notice that, using (48), condition (34) in the statement of the proposition
is equivalent to the condition m(y,ψ) = 0. Hence, to ﬁnish the proof it
33suﬃces to show that y∗ maximizes W(y) if and only if there exists ψ ∈ ˆ Θ(y∗)
satisfying m(y∗,ψ) = 0.
Suppose there exists ψ ∈ ˆ Θ(y∗) such that m(y∗,ψ) = 0. Let y < y∗.
Using (42) and (49) we have
W(y∗) − W(y) =
Z y∗
y
m(x, ˆ θ(x))dx ≥ 0.
Similarly, using (50) instead of (49), for y > y∗ we have
W(y) − W(y∗) =
Z y
y∗
m(x, ˆ θ(x)dx ≤ 0.
Hence, y∗ ∈ argmaxy W(y).
Conversely, suppose y∗ ∈ argmaxy W(y). If m(y∗, ˆ θ(y∗)) = 0 there is
nothing to prove, so suppose m(y∗, ˆ θ(y∗)) > 0 (the case m(y∗, ˆ θ(y∗)) < 0 is
analogous). Let ψ+(y∗) = limy↓y∗ ˆ θ(y). We show that m(y∗,ψ+(y∗)) ≤ 0, at
which point it follows from the continuity of m(y,θ) in θ that there exists
ψ ∈ ˆ Θ(y∗) satisfying m(y∗,ψ) = 0. Suppose ﬁrst that y∗ = x. Then
ψ+(y∗) = θ and m(y∗,ψ+(y∗)) ≤ 0 follows from (47). Next, suppose y∗ < x
and suppose m(y∗,ψ+(y∗)) > 0. Then (from (49) and the fact that ˆ x is
decreasing) there exists y > y∗ such that m(x, ˆ θ(x)) > 0 holds for all x ∈
(y∗,y). From (42) it then follows that W(y) > W(y∗), contradicting the
optimality of y∗. Consequently, m(y∗,ψ+(y∗)) ≤ 0 holds in this case, too,
ﬁnishing the proof. ||
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